Industrial Revolution by Gahan, Peter
INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION
Jeff Kennett's 
industrial 
revolution 
has severely 
embarrassed 
his federal 
colleagues. 
But as PETER 
GAHAN 
reports, John 
Howard may 
have to 
resort to 
Kennett-style 
compulsion in 
order to get 
his new 
industrial 
dystopia 
under wayL
Since the accession of the Kennett govern­ment last November Victorians have en­dured an industrial relations revolution of a kind which probably few had expected. 
Even the federal Coalition, whose own industrial 
relations policy is hardly cupidic, have been se­
verely embarrassed by the Victorian Coalition’s 
‘reforms’, both by the speed and lack of consulta­
tion with which they have been implemented, 
and by their primitive and compulsory nature.
The federal government has not been slow to 
seize on this embarrassment, painting Victoria as 
a dry run of the Coalition’s policies federally. 
This has put the federal Coalition in an even 
more difficult position. If they repudiate the 
Victorian revolution they will be seen as repudi­
ating elements of their own industrial relations 
platform. But if they support it they will be seen 
as supporting Jeff Kennett’s punitive and unilat­
eral approach.
Just how similar are the industrial relations 
policies of the Victorian and federal Coalitions? 
And how significant are the differences? In short, 
the answer seems to be that the differences as well 
as similarities highlight some of the contradic­
tions of the federal Coalition’s industrial rela­
tions model.
There are two notable differences between 
the Victorian and federal Coalit ion’s pol icies and 
their likely effects. First, the fact that industrial 
relations is a shared power between the state and 
commonwealth governments implies that the 
safety net provided by the two policies will have 
a different impact in each case. And second, the
federal coalition’s professed intention to achieve 
a new workplace culture based on teamwork and 
co-operation will clearly require a different method 
of implementation to that used by the Kennett 
government.
First, the matter of jurisdiction. The federal 
government has limited powers to legislate in 
industrial relations. The major source of its indus­
trial relations powers lies in its ability to make 
laws to prevent and settle interstate industrial 
disputes. These powers are limited to creating 
arbitration and conciliation agents to deal with 
such matters on their behalf, rather than legislat­
ing directly.
Historically, this has meant that unions and 
arbitration courts have a limited ability to carve 
out a common rule, so that awards cover all 
workers in a given industry or occupation. Thus 
the ability of the arbitration system to act as an 
effective safety net has been limited.
More recently, however, the High Court has 
interpreted this aspect of the constitution more 
widely. Asa result, the jurisdiction of the Indus­
trial Relations Commission (IRC) has increased 
significantly over the last 20 years or so. And the 
federal government may derive powerTrom other 
sections of the constitution to directly regulate 
industrial matters, although the exercise of these 
powers remains controversial. These include the 
external affairs power (which allows the federal 
government, as a signatory, to enforce interna­
tional treaties and agreements) and the corpora­
tions power (which allows the regulation of cor­
porations formed within Australia).
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The federal Coalition intends to make full 
use of these other powers to allow it to take a more 
direct role in the regulation of industrial rela­
tions. If Jobsback! is implemented, compulsory 
arbitration will be abolished. Instead, employees 
and employers will have to negotiate an employ­
ment agreement either collectively or individu­
ally. These agreements will have the legal status 
of a contract and, as such, will be subject to 
common and criminal law proceedings. If strikes 
occur during the life of, or in breach of, an 
agreement, employers will be able to sue indi­
vidual employees for breach of contract and seek 
to recoup any economic losses.
The legal protection given to trade unions 
will be abolished. While the formation of enter­
prise unions is encouraged, the legal status of 
unions is not clear. Jobsback! intends to remove 
legal protections for trade unions, yet it is in­
tended that unions will be registered. The most 
likely result of this ambiguity is that any registra­
tion procedure will stand as little more than a 
legal fiction. This is reinforced by the intention 
to provide a reconstituted IRC with the ability to 
take control of union funds and their internal 
organisation. Here is the rub: unions will effec­
tively be denied any legal status or protections at 
the federal level. They will be left with fewer and 
less adequate minima (such as the $3 minimum 
youth wage) which do not apply to all workers 
(they do not apply to contractors or non-award 
workers, for instance), and which have decreas­
ing coverage over time.
Attempts to revert to state jurisdiction— 
where unions are also denied legal recognition 
but at least have the ‘protection’ of minima with 
common rule status—will also be blocked. The 
broader coverage of state minima stems from the 
constitution. While the federal government is by 
and large limited to indirect means, the state 
governments have the power to directly legislate 
to cover all workers. Additionally, where they do 
exist in state jurisdictions, awards also have com­
mon rule status.
The difference may seem slight in the scheme 
of things, especially given that minimum condi­
tions vary between the Victorian system and the 
Jobsback! proposal. Nevertheless, for many em­
ployees such limited protection may be quite 
fundamental to how they live their lives in a 
world where global restructuring has already con­
siderably diminished their labour market oppor­
tunities.
This having been said, however, it is clear 
that the similarities between the two packages far 
outweigh any differences between them, despite 
the federal Coalition’s attempts to distance 
Jobsback! from Victorian developments. The fed­
eral Coalition spokesperson on industrial rela­
tions, John Howard, has repeatedly stated that
federal changes would be introduced in a far less 
confrontationist way—especially since Jobsback! 
is intended to engender a shared ideology and a 
‘team approach’ to industrial relations.
However, despite the rhetorical differences 
between the two policies, John Howard may find 
that political reality will dictate a similar policy 
outcome to that of the Kennett government— 
including, ironically, a far more interventionist 
role for government in industrial relations. And 
this interventionist role will have, of necessity, 
to be based on compulsion and punitive sanc­
tions rather than the overriding philosophy of 
minimal government intervention expressed in 
Jobsback! or Howard’s political rhetoric.
While the focus of Fightback! was on the 
GST, embedded within it is a plan for a radical 
change in the conduct of industrial relations and 
the structure of labour markets. The hub of that 
plan is that wages outcomes and the conduct of 
industrial relations will occur solely at the 
workplace and at the discretion of that workplace. 
This, it is stated, will demand an end to the 
highly interventionist role of the government 
and arbitration machinery, through such things 
as National Wage Cases.
This was later detailed with the launch of 
Jobsback! The philosophical underpinning of this 
policy—and one which John Howard has been at 
pains to impress— is freedom of contract. In 
other words, the federal Coalition’s policy is 
supposed to provide employee and employer 
with a greater capacity to make decisions about 
how their employment relationship should be 
structured. In this view, the role of unions, state 
institutions and direct intervention of the state 
through legislation simply serve to ‘distort’ a 
relationship that is otherwise natural and can 
result in greater efficiencies and shared benefits. 
Thus the parties are ‘free’ to contract between 
themselves on such matters as hours of work 
(when and for how long), redundancy arrange­
ments, penalty rates, holiday loading and other 
such matters.
The intention of Jobsback! is thus the with­
drawal of the state from the sphere of industrial 
relations and the provision of a minimal institu­
tional framework. The regulation of the employ­
ment contract is to be indistinguishable from 
other commercial contracts. Remedies against 
breaches will be sought through civil court ac­
tion. Collectivities such as unions have no spe­
cial status before the law. The outcome, accord­
ing to this view, is that workplace ‘bargaining’ 
becomes the sovereign sphere of decision mak­
ing over work issues—and all for the greater 
good.
As with the federal Coalition, the focus of 
the Victorian reforms has been a concern with 
the impact of arbitration and unions on the
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conduct of workplace industrial relations. Both 
are seen to inhibit the proper conduct of indus­
trial relations, inhibiting workplace flexibility 
and productivity in particular. Thus, the primary 
goal is said to be to provide employees and em­
ployers with the ability to freely regulate employ­
ment conditions to suit the needs of the enter­
prise within the market.
However, in initiating these changes the Vic- 
torian government has taken a decidedly inter­
ventionist role. The effect of the Employment 
Relations Act 1992 has been to thwart the capac­
ity of workers to continue to undertake collective 
actions to protect their wages and working con­
ditions, subjecting them to criminal and com­
mon law sanctions. Under the Act, employees 
will have their terms and conditions set by one or 
more of four legal means. At the base level, the 
contract of employment will be the chief instru­
ment of common law. Second, individual em­
ployees can negotiate an individual employment 
agreement directly with their employer. Third, as 
an alternative to individual agreements, employ­
ees—with the consent of the employer—can 
decide to negotiate a collective employment agree­
ment. Finally, if there is consent from both em­
ployees and employer, the collective agreement 
may be ratified by a new Employee Relations 
Commission (ERC) as an industrial award.
Yet, despite this range of alternatives, the Act 
makes it difficult for a group of workers to elect for 
a collective employment agreement or an indus­
trial award as the source of their terms of employ­
ment—for two reasons. The most obvious one is 
that the Act removes the legal impunities for 
trade unions— impunities which remained largely 
intact even under the Thatcher government in 
the UK. Likewise, the ability of unions to gain 
legal status and protection of bargaining rights 
have remained features of US labour law also, 
despite ‘union bashing’ tactics on the part of 
employers.
The second reason lies in the changed struc­
ture of the legal regulation of industrial relations 
itself—particularly in the case of the diminished 
role of the new Victorian ERC. This body has 
fewer powers to deal with industrial disputes 
unless both parties consent. This, as historical 
experience with voluntary arbitration shows, is 
so unlikely as to render it ineffective. The major 
exception to this ‘imposed voluntarism’ is the 
case of unfair dismissals. However, the proce­
dures which individual employees are required to 
undertake to respond to unfair dismissal will 
make this a costly and lengthy process.
Instead of awards and the use of due process 
through tribunal regulation, employees will be 
forced over time to ‘negotiate’ individual or col­
lective employment agreements. Even here, the 
bias towards individual agreements will make
collective ones difficult in many cases. While the 
compulsion to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
ERC is removed, it is substituted for the compul­
sory jurisdiction of the new Industrial Division of 
the Magistrates Court. The court is armed with 
considerable punitive remedies to compel unions 
and employees to agree to the new industrial 
regulations.
Jobsback! is couched in the political rhetoric 
of freedom. The impending changes are supposed 
to free the workplace from the shackles of over­
regulation so that those at the workplace will be 
better able to decide such matters on equal terms 
themselves. The role of the state, so Jobsback! 
tells us, is to back off. It is to end the compulsory 
submission of both workers and employers to 
over-zealous governments and the specially-cre­
ated jurisdictions that provide certain interest 
groups with a status not enjoyed by other indi­
viduals and groups in society.
The reality of the intended policy is, how­
ever, diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and 
ideology of a free and happy workplace culture. 
Like the Victorian changes, Jobsback! is not so 
much about the withdrawal of the state from the 
regulation of employment matters and an end to 
compulsion but, rather, the substitution of one 
compulsory jurisdiction for another.
Common law regulation requires that the 
parties submit their disputes over breach of con­
tract at the request of one party only—as is 
currently the case with arbitration. In other words, 
it is not possible for the jurisdiction of common 
(and criminal) law courts to be denied simply 
because one party does not wish to submit to it.
The replacement of the jurisdiction of the 
IRC with that of common law courts cannot be 
reasonably interpreted as empowering the parties 
to make their own decisions freely in an 
unconstrained manner, for the good of all con­
cerned. Rather, it amounts to the replacement of 
one compulsory jurisdiction, historically created 
to ameliorate the imbalance of power between 
capital and labour, with another compulsory ju­
risdiction that has historically been hostile to the 
interests of working people and the institutions 
created to protect them in their working lives. 
The result will not increase freedom but, rather, 
greater compulsion, as the balance of bargaining 
power dramatically shifts towards employers with 
considerable resources and institutional support 
in their favour. Thus, whatever the intention, in 
practice the federal Coalition’s ‘deregulatory’ in­
dustrial relations policies may have to be imple­
mented with the same degree of coercive govern­
ment intervention as the V ictorian reforms which 
so embarrass John Howard. ■
P E T E R  G A H A N  teaches in Industrial Rela­
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